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1 Introduction 
One basic tenet of the standard theory of international trade is that tastes are homothetic. 
For a long time this was a convenient simplification because, along with the assumption 
that tastes are also identical across countries, it allowed trade theorists to concentrate on 
the supply side as an explanation for the causes of international trade. However, what 
started out as a convenient modeling technique propagated into virtually all empirical 
work in international trade, regardless of whether the assumption on homotheticity is 
empirically tenable or not. This is problematic because, as we review in more detail 
below, there is consistent and robust evidence that tastes cannot properly be considered to 
be homothetic. In particular, one conclusion from accepting the nonhomotheticity of 
tastes is that income distribution and income per capita become arguments for the 
aggregate demand function. Since one country’s international trade is given by its 
aggregate supply minus its aggregate demand, we conclude that income distribution and 
income per capita are important determinants of international trade from the demand 
side.1 This effect has been almost completely absent from the empirical trade literature.2 
In particular, as we shall argue, the standard gravity model, which has been used widely 
to explain trade flows among countries, can only be considered to be complete if it does 
include income distribution and income per capita as explanatory variables. 
Specifically, we propose in this paper to demonstrate the role that income 
distribution plays in international trade, while also controlling for income per capita. To 
enhance the persuasiveness of our results it is crucial that we rely on the most standard 
and successful empirical model of trade, the gravity model mentioned above. Thus we are 
quite purposeful in excluding the possibility that our results stem in any way from an 
innovation in the methodology. The gravity model, which explains the volume of trade 
by the economic masses of the trading partners and the distance between them, has been 
remarkably successful. In practical applications, researchers sometimes call its use the 
“modified gravity methodology” because, depending on the question that the researcher 
intends to ask, she modifies the basic model with some variable or variables of interest. 
                                                 
1 Mitra and Trindade (2005) work out a theory of this effect. They also discuss intra-industry trade and 
international transmission of inequality, which are outside the scope of the present paper. 
 
2 We discuss below the few exceptions to this general statement, and their relation to our work. 
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For example, in the first paper (to our knowledge) to look at the impact of the internet on 
trade, Freund and Weinhold (2004) include variables on the number of web hosts in each 
country to show that they have a positive impact on trade. Dunlevy (2006) asks the 
question: what is the impact of the immigrant population in the United States on state-
level trade with foreign nations? Naturally, he uses the stock of immigrants in each state 
as his main explanatory variable. Hutchinson (2005) wants to study the impact of 
language differences on trade, taking the interesting stance that what matters most is how 
much languages differ from one another. Therefore, he modifies the gravity model with a 
measure of linguistic distance (Japanese being more distant from English than Dutch 
from English, for example). As a final recent example of this methodology, Rose (2004) 
augments the gravity model with membership in the WTO/GATT to ask whether the 
WTO enhances trade. Surprisingly he is unable to find any significant effect of 
membership in the WTO/GATT on trade. 
 We begin our argument with the empirical fact that tastes cannot be considered to 
be homothetic. The evidence that all goods do not have unit income elasticity of demand 
abounds in the literature. In particular the papers by Hunter and Markusen (1988) and 
Hunter (1991) specifically test for nonhomotheticity of preferences by estimating linear 
income-expansion paths that have intercepts significantly different from zero. Their 
model is consistent with a minimum subsistence level for one good (N), causing 
consumers at very low levels of income to consume good N only, purchasing the other 
good (L) only at higher levels of income. Good N is a necessity and good L is a luxury, in 
the sense that their income elasticities of demand are below and above one, respectively. 
The strongest prediction of Hunter and Markusen’s and Hunter’s models is that income 
per capita is a determinant of aggregate demand. If income per capita increases in a 
perfectly equal country with a representative consumer, she increases her budget share of 
the luxury good in response. Note that, while the positive intercepts of the income-
expansion paths make budget shares a function of per capita income, the linearity of the 
paths imply that income redistribution, holding per capita income constant, has no impact 
on the demand for each good, as long as everyone's income is sufficiently high to 
consume both goods. 
Further empirical evidence is provided by Thursby and Thursby (1987). They 
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estimate a gravity model augmented with income per capita, finding that countries with 
more similar incomes per capita trade more. They ascribe this result to countries with 
similar GDP/capita having similar consumption patterns, which is an indication of 
nonhomothetic tastes, and stems directly from the Linder (1961) theory that they are 
trying to test. Note that this paper is closer to our framework than the aforementioned 
pieces by Hunter and Hunter and Markusen, since like us Thursby and Thursby also 
estimate a gravity model. However, their paper differs from our approach in that they also 
do not allow for a role for income distribution. 
The empirical work mentioned in the paragraphs above shows that income per 
capita plays an important role in the determination of expenditure shares, thereby 
establishing the importance of nonhomotheticity in tastes. But only Francois and Kaplan 
(1996) look at the effect of income distribution, and in particular of inequality, on trade. 
However, note that they perform this in a non-gravity setting. More specifically, they 
look at inequality in developing countries as a determinant of the shares of imports of 
manufactured goods from developed countries. They find that these shares increase with 
the inequality of the developing country (and with its per capita income), and more so in 
product categories that are more differentiated, according to their classification of product 
differentiation. 
Having established from previous work that tastes should properly be considered 
to be nonhomothetic, we consider in the next section the possibility that they are so in a 
way that makes income-expansion paths have some curvature. As already pointed out this 
is different from the work of Hunter (1991) and Hunter and Markusen (1988). See also 
the seminal contribution of Markusen (1986) who also considers income-expansion paths 
that are linear but with an intercept. When the income-expansion path is actually curved, 
income distribution becomes a determinant of aggregate demand and therefore of trade 
flows. The intuition is simple. Imagine that income is redistributed in a country, by taking 
one dollar from the poor and giving it to the rich. Given curved income-expansion paths, 
the same dollar will be used by the rich to buy proportionately more luxuries than before. 
Then, aggregate demand for luxuries increases, and aggregate demand for necessities 
decreases. All else equal (including the country’s total income, its income per capita, and 
the income of all other countries), this country will import more luxuries. Therefore, a 
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country pair’s GDPs and the distance between them, which constitute the backbone of the 
gravity model, cannot be considered to be a complete model in order to determine world 
trade flows. At a minimum the gravity model must be augmented with income per capita 
and a measure of income distribution. 
We use these insights to set up our own modified gravity model. We then ask 
whether these measures perform according the theoretical predictions. But in order to do 
that we need to identify which goods are necessities and which goods are luxuries. In our 
main approach, we use consumer data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, along with a 
concordance that we created between BLS product categories and SITC codes, to 
categorize goods into luxuries and necessities at the four-digit SITC level. We then use 
our classification to re-aggregate trade flows into luxuries and necessities, and estimate 
the gravity model separately for imports of either type of good. 
A summary of our results follows. First, we find that pooling all country pairs 
does not lead to any economically meaningful results. A moment’s reflection reveals that 
this is not at all a surprising finding, since our necessity-luxury classification is based on 
US household data. Even with identical tastes (an assumption that we maintain 
throughout) many goods are likely to be luxuries for low incomes, and necessities at 
higher incomes. For example, used cars are likely necessities in the United States (as 
people become richer used cars become less attractive to them) but are certainly luxuries 
in some of the poorest countries. Some very common consumer goods are also likely to 
change from luxuries to necessities. For example, packaged cereal is considered a luxury 
in Jamaica,3 but like any food items it would be hard to argue that it is a luxury in the 
developed world. Given these considerations, we restrict our sample to country pairs in 
which the importing country is developed, thus better aligning its income level with the 
US’s. We find strong evidence that imports of luxuries are positively related to importing 
country inequality, and imports of necessities are negatively related to it, exactly as our 
theory would predict. 
Partly motivated by Francois and Kaplan’s (1996) identification of luxuries as 
being differentiated goods, we then turn to a classification of product differentiation, 
constructed by Rauch (1999). We check whether inequality matters differently for trade 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Neville Francis for this example. 
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in differentiated goods, as compared to trade in homogenous goods. We find only weak 
evidence of systematic differences in the inequality coefficient, thus not lending support 
to one of Francois and Kaplan’s assumptions. We conclude that the assumed relationship 
between product differentiation and income elasticity of demand is not very strong. 
In our third approach, we look at a classification of trade flows based on the 
income levels of the country of origin (while controlling for the country of destination). 
We find that, holding everything else constant, an increase in the inequality of the 
importing country leads to higher imports from rich countries and a reduction of imports 
from poor countries. This result clearly shows that on average high-income countries 
produce luxuries and low-income countries produce necessities, thus validating one key 
assumption in Markusen (1986), which is also used by Mitra and Trindade (2005): high 
income elasticity goods are on average capital intensive. Note that in our second and third 
approaches we use our full sample (allowing less developed countries to be importers) 
since we are no longer relying on consumer data from US sources. 
We consider our paper complementary to Francois and Kaplan (1996), while 
departing from it in a number of dimensions. First, quite importantly, we purposefully 
choose the most successful and widely employed model of empirical trade, the gravity 
model. We will then be able to pinpoint precisely how much inequality matters for trade, 
as compared to the standard results. For example, our calculations show that if income 
distribution in the United States became as equal as Canada, the US would import about 9 
– 13% less in luxury goods and 13 – 19% more in necessity goods. Second, and equally 
important, note that Francois and Kaplan in their first approach rely on two crucial 
assumptions to identify goods that are luxuries (we mention their second and third 
approaches below). First, they assume that luxuries are differentiated goods. Second, they 
assume that differentiated goods are those that have higher indices of intra-industry trade. 
While both links in this chain of assumptions are justified by Linder’s story (which is 
ultimately what Francois and Kaplan are trying to test), it remains an empirical question 
to decide whether they are valid or not. We break open both links with the use of the first 
direct classification of luxuries and necessities that is compatible with international trade 
data. Therefore we can test directly the effect of income inequality on trade of luxuries 
and necessities. 
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Note that in our analysis each observation is a country pair at a point in time. 
Therefore, we make use of much more information than Francois and Kaplan, whose 
study aggregates imports to each developing country across different exporters and does 
not have a time component. The panel structure of our data allows us to control for 
country-specific effects, expunging the results from any such effects that might 
contaminate the impact of inequality. Note that while for the first part of our analysis, we 
are forced by the origin of the goods classification (the US) to look at the imports of 
developed countries only, for the rest of the analysis we pool all developed and 
developing country data. Using income distribution data from developing countries only, 
as Francois and Kaplan (1996) do, can be problematic, because of potential measurement 
problems in those countries.4 Importantly we will be able to state what trade looks like 
for different pairs of countries (such as between two high income countries, between a 
high and a low income country, and so on), and will argue that the patterns of trade with 
respect to luxuries and necessities are different for different pair types, which to our 
knowledge is a new empirical effect (see the theories in Markusen 1986 and Mitra and 
Trindade 2005). 
In sum, the paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we examine the 
role of inequality (through nonhomotheticity of preferences) in determining the 
composition of trade. We emphasize that this effect occurs from the demand side, which 
has been an understudied aspect of international trade flows. Second, we document novel 
patterns of trade between different pairs of countries. Third, we hope that our 
classification of 4-digit industries into luxuries and necessities should be useful to 
researchers interested in the role of income elasticity in trade. 
2 Theoretical Considerations  
If tastes are homothetic, the income expansion path is a straight line starting from the 
origin.5 If tastes are nonhomothetic, then some goods are luxuries and others are 
necessities, meaning that they have income elasticities of demand higher and lower than 
                                                 
4 This would be the case, for example, if a large proportion of asset ownership and of economic 
transactions in developing countries is informal. 
 
5 The income expansion path is the locus of consumption bundles for varying income levels at constant 
prices. 
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one, respectively. The empirical investigations of Hunter and Markusen (1988) and 
Hunter (1991) find that, in contrast to the standard assumption in trade models, tastes are 
nonhomothetic in a statistically and economically significant way. According to Hunter, 
for example, restricting preferences to be homothetic causes an overestimation of the 
total volume of trade by approximately 25 percent.  
 In this paper, we take the stance that if tastes are nonhomothetic, there is a case 
for studying the effects of income distribution on trade flows. To our knowledge, ours is 
the first gravity-based paper to do so.  Suppose that there are n individuals in an economy 
with two goods, which we call L and N (luxuries and necessities). It is well-known that if 
we assume preferences to be homothetic and identical, we can write the aggregate 
demand function for L as follows:   
  ),,( IpDL =         (1) 
in which p is the price ratio (= pL/pN) between the two goods, and ∑ == nj jII 1 is total 
income in the economy, Ij being jth individual’s income. There is an analogous demand 
function for N.  Now let us relax the assumption of homothetic tastes, which we do in two 
steps. First, suppose that the income expansion path is a straight line that does not pass 
through the origin (see the line labeled E in figure 1). This is usually called quasi-
homothetic tastes. This path is consistent, for example, with assuming that good N is 
food, which has a minimum subsistence level that every consumer tries to reach before 
she buys any good L. 
 Let us first note that with quasi-homothetic tastes aggregate demand no longer is 
simply a function of aggregate income. Even with a perfectly equal economy where all 
consumers have the same income (and consume say at point C0), we must now know 
where along line E each consumer is: the richer he gets, the more proportion of good L he 
consumes. Thus, income per capita matters. However note that income distribution still 
does not matter, as long as all consumers are rich enough to consume both goods. 
Suppose for example that the economy has two consumers, both consuming at C0. 
Redistribute income from one consumer to the other, such that they end up consuming at 
points C1 and C2, respectively. Because C1 + C2 = 2C0, aggregate demand remains 
unchanged. In conclusion, with quasi-homothetic tastes, equation (1) is replaced by  
  ),/,,( nIIpDL =        (2) 
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that is, we add income per capita I/n as an argument of aggregate demand.  
 Second, suppose that preferences are strictly nonhomothetic in such a way that the 
income expansion path is curved (see figure 2). Income per capita still matters here, of 
course. But now, performing the same income redistribution experiment as above, we see 
that aggregate demand changes. In particular, note that aggregate demand for good L 
increases (L 1 + L2 > 2L0), while it decreases for good N (N 1 + N2 < 2N0). Thus, aggregate 
demand now depends on the income of each consumer in the economy: as inequality in 
the country rises, aggregate demand for luxuries increases and aggregate demand for 
necessities decreases. Equations (1) and (2) are amended as follows: 
  ).,...,,,( 21 nIIIpDL =        (3) 
One problem with this specification is that we do not have data on every single consumer. 
What we do have are various summary measures of income distribution. More precisely 
we have several moments of the distribution. Consequently, we work with an 
approximation of equation (3) by including those moments: 
  ),,/,,( σnIIpDL =         
where σ  is the measure of income dispersion, that is of income inequality.   
 We make use of these insights to modify the gravity equation. Let the value of 
country i’s production of luxuries and necessities be denoted by XiL and XiN , respectively. 
Country i’s values of exports of luxuries and necessities to country j are then given by 
N
ijijijij XsX ,XsX NNLLL == , respectively, where NL jj ss and  represent country j’s 
shares of world expenditure on luxuries and necessities respectively.  Further, letting 
)1(and LNL iii ααα −=  denote the shares of luxuries and necessities respectively in the 
overall GDP of country i, and taking logs, we have  
  .loglogloglog
loglogloglog
iijij
iijij
GDPsX
 ,GDPsX
NNN
LLL ++=
++=
α
α     (4) 
With non-homothetic preferences, we can write 
  
),,,)/(,(
),,,)/(,(
Wjj
W
j
j
Wjj
W
j
j
capitaGDP
GDP
GDPs
capitaGDP
GDP
GDPs
N
L
σσψ
σσφ
=
=
       
where (GDP/capita) j denotes GDP per capita of country j, GDPW is world GDP, σj is the 
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inequality measure of country j and σW is the inequality measure for the world. Here, all 
countries face a common world relative price of luxuries to necessities, and therefore this 
variable is absorbed into a year fixed effect in our regressions. A first-order Taylor 
expansion yields: 
 
.)/log()log(log
,)/log()log(log
43210
43210
Wjj
W
j
j
Wjj
W
j
j
capitaGDP
GDP
GDPs
capitaGDP
GDP
GDPs
N
L
σγσγγγγ
σβσββββ
++++=
++++=
 
Here, the coefficients of per capita GDP and inequality are positive in the case of luxuries 
and negative in the case of necessities. Plugging into equation (4), we have: 
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  (5) 
We estimate equations similar to equation (5). They are of course the well-known gravity 
equations, in that exports from country i to country j depend on the logarithms of the 
GDP of each country. However, the equations are modified by the inclusion of GDP per 
capita and inequality for the importing country. Note that according to the gravity 
literature, the GDP per capita plays a dual role in the estimation, in that the stage of 
development of the trading countries may capture trade barriers.6 Therefore, its role 
through nonhomotheticity will be virtually impossible to identify. The effect of 
nonhomothetic preferences through the inequality measure is more clear-cut and less 
contaminated. As is traditional in the gravity literature, we also allow for natural barriers 
to trade, proxied by distance. One last modification is that we expect from the model that 
the coefficients on luxuries and necessities to be different, and therefore for our main 
model we will estimate two different equations, one for luxuries and one for necessities. 
In deciding on how to classify goods as necessities and luxuries, we need to 
address the fact that nothing guarantees that a good is only a necessity or a luxury. In 
fact, the opposite is likely to occur often, for example a good may at low levels of income 
be a luxury, while at higher levels of income it becomes a necessity. We will use US 
                                                 
6 Frankel (1997) argues that per-capita GDP's capture formal and informal barriers to trade, and are 
therefore negatively correlated with trade barriers not directly measured by distance. 
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household data to classify goods into luxuries and necessities, as those are the most 
readily available household data, and also the most likely to be accurate. Note that we 
maintain the assumption of identical preferences throughout this paper. Therefore, our 
use of US data is a less severe problem when we use our classification to study other 
developed countries’ demands, as the populations in developed countries will be in the 
same approximate region of the income expansion path as the US population. But it may 
be a problem when we use the classification for less developed countries. Being attuned 
to this difficulty will have the consequence that we shall have to drop observations in 
which a less developed country is the importer (but not when it is the exporter). 
3 Empirical Strategy 
A. Direct measure: luxuries versus necessities 
The standard gravity model estimates the volume of trade between two countries, as 
determined by the product of their GDPs, and some factors that may stimulate or impede 
trade. Among the latter factors, it is standard to include the distance between the two 
countries (a proxy for trade costs). As discussed in the previous section, we add per-
capita GDP and a measure for the second moment of income distribution (income 
inequality), both of which also matter if preferences are nonhomothetic. We have already 
noted that GDP per capita will perform a dual role, and its interpretation should be treated 
with care. This is one further reason to include inequality, since its interpretation is more 
straightforward. 
We expect that the impact of the different variables, especially GDP per capita 
and inequality, on the international trade of some good will depend on the nature of the 
good being transacted. If the good is considered a luxury, then the impact of importing 
country inequality should be positive, while the converse is true of necessities. We must 
therefore classify goods as luxuries or necessities in a manner that is compatible with the 
trade data, and aggregate trade flows according to these two categories. We describe in 
the next section and in the appendix how we constructed our classification. We then 
estimate the following model: 
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 [ ] [ ]
,Inequality)Distance(log
)/(log)/(log
)(log)(logln
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ijktjtkijk
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++
++
+++++=
ββ
ββ
ββ
  (6) 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
Xijkt: exports from country i to country j in category k (luxuries or necessities) in year t; 
GDPit: country i’s GDP in year t; 
(GDP/Capita)it: country i’s GDP per capita in year t; 
Distanceij: great circle distance between principal cities of countries i and j; 
Inequalityjt: income inequality in (importing) country j in year t; 
vijkt, uijkt: error terms, with assumed normal i.i.d. distributions. 
 We use country fixed effects (Aik and Ajk) throughout, which stand for country 
specific factors that may affect differently trade of luxuries and trade of necessities. 
These might include differences in tastes, comparative advantage in one of the two types 
of goods, country-specific trade barriers, or multilateral resistance effects.7 Finally, we 
also use “fixed time effects,” Akt, to account for such things as business cycles, systematic 
currency fluctuations, changes in price levels, worldwide rise or fall in protectionism and 
so on. Also, these time effects are added to control for variables that although they 
change with time, are common to all countries at a given point in time. Examples of such 
variables are world GDP and world inequality (GDPW and σW in our previous section). 
 
B. Homogeneous versus differentiated goods 
Next we use a classification devised by Rauch (1999), which separates goods at the 4-
digit SITC level according to three different types: goods that are traded in organized 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the latter, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The case for using country fixed 
effects to capture multilateral resistance is made by Feenstra (2003). Gravity models with country fixed 
effects have been estimated by Feenstra (2002) and Dunlevy (2006), among others. Note that this paper is 
not about trade barriers, or about how they interact, which is Anderson and van Wincoop’s true 
contribution to the literature. In other words, the effects that we test here would still be present, even if all 
trade barriers were zero. Any attempt to use Anderson and van Wincoop’s full approach would suffer the 
difficulty that their model was deduced with the assumption of homothetic tastes, and therefore would not 
be immediately relevant for our purposes. Using fixed country-year effects also does not solve the problem, 
as the fixed effects would absorb our inequality variable. 
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exchanges; goods that are not traded in organized exchanges but for which there is a 
published reference price; and goods which fall under neither of the two previous 
categories. Rauch argues that the last type is more differentiated than the first two types. 
We estimate equation (6) for two categories of goods. k=w+r is the category that 
aggregates trade in all goods with organized exchanges (w) plus goods with reference 
prices (r). This is the category of homogeneous goods. k=n denotes trade in all other 
goods, that is, in differentiated goods. We are motivated to separate trade into these two 
categories motivated by the following two reasons: (a) Linder’s (1961) book, which also 
motivated previous empirical work, and which argued that luxuries are manufactured, 
differentiated, goods; (b) Francois and Kaplan’s (1996) evidence that works in the same 
direction. It is certainly plausible that differentiated goods such as automobiles and toys 
tend to be bought by consumers who have considerable disposable income after the bare 
necessities of life are met. Since, unlike Francois and Kaplan, we have at our disposal a 
direct measure of product differentiation, it seems worthwhile to compare our results with 
theirs.  
 
C. Source country 
We next attempt to correlate the country of origin of a given good to whether that good is 
a necessity or a luxury. Here, the working hypothesis is that a country will either produce 
luxuries or necessities but not both. Because this is an obvious approximation of reality it 
is surprising how strong the results come out. Specifically, we re-estimate the models in 
equation (6) differently. The first difference is that we use total exports from country i to 
country j. Second, we include the variables HighIncomei and MidIncomei, which are 
dummies for whether the exporting country i is high or mid-income. Third, we also 
include HighIncomej and MidIncomej, which perform the analogous role for the 
importing country. These dummy variables are introduced both in levels and interacted 
with Inequality for the importing country. 
 We then estimate the average impact of inequality on bilateral trade, for the 
different combinations of income levels of the importing and the exporting countries. 
Since we allow three income levels (high-income, medium-income, or low-income), 
there will be nine combinations in all. 
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D. Robustness checks 
Starting with the estimation that uses our direct classification of luxuries and necessities, 
note that the dependent variable Xijkt is bounded below by zero, and the bound is observed 
for a large number of bilateral observations. Therefore, besides estimating models (6) 
with OLS, we also estimate a corresponding Tobit model. The equation is changed to: 
 [ ] [ ]
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where the estimation is performed with maximum likelihood methods. Note that for all 
models we replaced the (logs of) missing trade flows with zeros. This is because typically 
missing trade flows happen between small countries that are far apart, and the most likely 
reason for no trade to be recorded is absent or negligible trade between them. 
 We also perform median regressions as robustness. This is a type of regression 
that attempts to estimate the median of the dependent variable (as opposed to the mean), 
conditional on the independent variables. Therefore, it is quite robust to outliers and 
bunching of zeros in the dependent variable. 
 We then try further ways to check the robustness of the results. First, since it is 
possible that the impact of inequality is non-linear, we experiment with the inclusion of 
the square of inequality. Second, apart from using the Gini coefficient, the most widely 
used summary measure of inequality, we also experiment with the ratio of the income of 
the top quintile in the income distribution to the income of the bottom quintile. In this 
way, we hope to capture various aspects of income inequality. This also has the 
advantage that it responds to a possible criticism of the Gini index, namely that it is a 
measure that is relatively insensitive to changes in the extremes of the distribution.  
 One further issue may be the possible endogeneity of the inequality variable. This 
may occur through a Stolper-Samuelson effect, in which a country’s trade has a direct 
impact on its factor rewards, and thus an indirect impact on inequality.8 We handle such 
concerns by restricting the sample in two ways: first, we exclude all observations in 
which the exporting country represents more than 1% of the importing country’s trade; 
                                                 
8 A country with a leftist government that wishes to enhance equality may well use trade policy to do so. 
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second, we exclude all observations in which the exporting country has one of the 5 
largest GDPs for that year. The goals of both restrictions are the same. By excluding each 
country’s major trading partners, we are restricting ourselves to imports that will have no 
or at most a negligible impact on inequality, but on which inequality will according to 
theory most definitely have an impact. 
4 Data 
One contribution of this paper was the creation of a classification of goods as luxuries or 
necessities that is compatible with the most widely used trade classification in 
manufactures, namely the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). In this 
section we briefly describe our procedure, leaving to the appendix a more complete 
documentation of our methodology to create this dataset and of some data issues that 
arose in the process. First, we obtained data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on US 
households’ expenditure layouts in 2001. The BLS separates US household population 
into five income quintiles and, for each quintile, lists the average expenditure share of 
about 100 consumption categories. These data are then used to extract information about 
which goods are luxuries and necessities. The next step was matching goods categories 
from the BLS with categories in international trade data in manufactures, which are 
coded in the SITC. We used this concordance between the two classifications to 
aggregate bilateral exports according to whether they are necessities or luxuries. At the 
end of this process, for any exporter i, importer j, and year t, we have two trade flows: 
exports by i to j in luxuries; and exports by i to j in necessities. 
The trade data come from the World Trade Analyzer (WTA), which is a panel 
covering trade flows from 1970 to 1997 for most countries of the world, organized by the 
SITC, Revision 2, at the 4-digit aggregation level. The WTA was compiled by Statistics 
Canada, using bilateral trade data from the United Nations Statistical Office, and it has 
been made widely available by Robert Feenstra (2000). The usefulness of this dataset 
comes from its two main characteristics. First, Statistics Canada took special care to 
match import and export data between any two countries. Second, imports from one 
country to another are reported in quite a disaggregated manner. The latter feature is 
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important for our purposes, since we must aggregate trade data according to our 
luxury/necessity classification, and according to the Rauch commodity categories. 
 We also use Rauch’s (1999) classification, which divides 4-digit SITC goods into 
three groups: goods that are traded on organized exchanges (denoted by w); goods that 
have reference prices (r); and finally those goods that fall into none of these categories, 
and therefore can be thought of as differentiated (n). We aggregated w and r goods into 
w+r, and following Rauch take this aggregate to be homogeneous goods. 
 For the purpose of defining income level dummies, we separated countries into 
high, medium, and low-income countries according to the World Bank’s cutoffs to 
designate high income, middle income and low income countries. Note that countries can 
change their income classifications over time. 
 Inequality data come from Dollar and Kraay (2002), according to whom theirs is 
the largest dataset on inequality available up to date. It is largely a recompilation of the 
UN-WIDER dataset that was also used by Deininger and Squire (1996) to construct what 
they call “a high quality dataset.” These data contain a panel of 137 countries, spanning 
the years from 1955 to 1999. For the main part of the analysis we use the Gini coefficient 
as the summary measure of inequality. 
 Real GDP and real per-capita GDP (in 1995 constant US dollars) come from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators. We obtained the logarithm of the great 
circle distance data from Rose (2004). 
 
5 Estimation Results 
A. Direct measure of luxuries and necessities 
We begin by aggregating bilateral exports into luxuries and necessities, and we then 
estimate equation (6) separately for each category. In light of the possibility that some 
goods switch from necessities to luxuries or from luxuries to necessities at different 
income levels and because we used US household data to classify goods, we restrict the 
sample to high-income importing countries only, keeping exporting countries 
unrestricted. The results of such a model are presented in the first two columns of table 
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1.9 We also experimented with a model slightly different from equation (6), in that it 
restricts the importer and exporter GDP elasticities to be the same, as well as the importer 
and exporter GDP per capita elasticities to be the same. That model – which is sometimes 
taken to be the standard gravity model – is reported on columns 3 and 4 of the table for 
ease of comparison. 
 We first note from either set of estimations that the gravity model works well, as 
countless numbers of papers have shown before us. All gravity variables enter with the 
right sign and roughly with magnitudes comparable to other gravity papers (note that in 
columns 1 and 2, the parameters on Log mGDP and Log (mGDP/capita) need to be added 
to get the total effect of the importing country’s GDP). 
 It is remarkable that only one variable changes sign between the two categories, 
and that is precisely the variable that the theory predicts. In particular, the main 
prediction of the model is strongly confirmed: imports of luxuries go up with importing 
country inequality, and imports of necessities go down. A percentage point increase in 
importing country inequality causes an increase of luxury imports by 0.9 percent and a 
reduction of necessity imports by 1.3 percent.10 Thus for example if the US changed from 
its Gini index of 45 to Canada’s Gini index of roughly between 30 and 35 (depending on 
year), the US would see a 9-13% reduction in luxury imports and a 13-18% increase in 
necessity imports. These are surely non trivial numbers. Inequality seems to have not 
only a statistical significant but also an economically significant impact on the structure 
of trade.11 
 
B. Homogeneous versus differentiated goods 
The results that are most easily comparable to the work of Francois and Kaplan (1996) 
are shown on table 2. They are the estimation of equation (6) for the Rauch differentiated 
                                                 
9 The estimation with an unrestricted sample of all importing countries fails to get results that are 
economically meaningful and robust to inclusion and exclusion of country dummies, econometric 
techniques, and measures of inequality. 
 
10 Note that the Gini coefficient in our dataset is measured on a scale of 0 to 100 (not 0 to 1). 
 
11 Table 1 also suggests that as we increase the per capita incomes of both trading partners, the composition 
of their trade shifts in favor of luxuries (even though trade increases both in luxuries and in necessities). 
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and homogeneous categories, presented in odd and even columns, respectively. We 
obtain at best only modest support for Francois and Kaplan’s approach. In two of their 
three approaches, the identifying assumption is that luxuries are differentiated goods.12 
Here we use a more recent, and arguably better, classification of product differentiation 
than the one they used.13 When using the full sample we do not find that imports of 
homogeneous goods (identified as necessities) decrease with inequality. When we restrict 
the sample as we did in the previous subsection to high-income importing countries only, 
we do find that imports of homogeneous goods decrease with importing country’s 
inequality, but the coefficient for the differentiated goods (identified as luxuries) loses 
significance and enters with the wrong sign. These results are perhaps not on the whole 
surprising, because we are after all positing that the definition of differentiated goods 
(ultimately a combination of technological and taste characteristics, as defined by Rauch) 
somehow maps to the definition of luxuries (purely a taste characteristic). 
 Overall, no specification shows a statistically significant pattern that agrees with 
the theoretical prediction. This stands in contrast with the results of the previous 
subsection, in which by using a direct classification of luxuries and necessities, and thus 
avoiding any identifying assumptions, we do find such a statistically and economically 
significant pattern. Note that the contrast in table 2 between the two samples (the full 
sample and the restricted sample) alerts once more to the importance of considering 
demand, and nonhomothetic tastes in particular, for the empirical study of international 
trade. If tastes were homothetic, and each country’s demand were simply proportional to 
world supply, then restricting the sample of importing countries should not matter, as 
long as we do not restrict the sample of exporting countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 These are their first and third approach. Their second approach assumes that luxuries are goods that 
industrial countries trade more. We shall have something of this flavor in the next sub-section, in which we 
divide trade according to the income per capita of the trading partners. 
13 In their first approach they use the further assumption that differentiated goods have high indices of 
intra-industry trade. In their third approach, they simply count the number of sub-industries that the 
industrial classification provides for each industry. Rauch’s measure is arguably an improvement on both of 
these approaches, since it relies on market responses to each good (for example: are there reference prices 
widely available for the good?), not on the decisions of the officials that create industrial classifications.  
 18
C. Source country 
We now turn our attention to whether luxuries and necessities differ according to the 
income level or the stage of development of the source (exporting) country. Once again 
we find economically and statistically significant results. The main message we find is: 
developing countries export necessities, and developed countries export luxuries. We 
conjecture that this may be due to systematic technological differences between luxuries 
and necessities, which cause necessities to be labor-intensive goods. But it may also be 
due to differences in technological advancement of less developed versus more 
developed countries.14 The result here is also consistent with the Markusen (1986) 
conjecture implying that the share of luxury production is higher in countries with higher 
per-capita income. This is also posited in Mitra and Trindade (2005). Then, if the 
exporting country i is high income, it will have a higher αL in equation (4), which in turn 
leads to a higher predicted X ijL, than if the exporting country were low or middle income. 
 In order to thoroughly investigate this issue (and to see the roles of the country of 
origin versus that of the destination country), we created four additional dummy 
variables: HighIncomei and MidIncomei take value one if the exporting country i is high 
or mid-income, respectively, with two analogous variables for the importing country. 
Table 3 presents the regression results. All gravity variables enter with the right sign and 
most are significant at the 1% level. 
 Note that since we interact the dummy variables with our measure of inequality 
for the importing country, we need to calculate the partial effect of inequality on imports. 
Since there are three types of countries (high, medium, and low income), there are nine 
types of country pairs for one-way trade. Table 4 presents the partial effects of inequality 
on imports, arranged in a matrix with all nine possibilities. 15 Again, these partial effects 
can be fairly large in magnitude. One can discern a fair amount of structure. Note that 
since the different rows let the income level of the exporting country vary, this is the 
                                                 
14 In other words, the reason for more developed countries to have comparative advantage in luxuries may 
be Hecksher-Ohlin: luxuries such as automobiles (but also leather bags and fashion clothing) systematically 
use capital more intensively than necessities. But the reason may also be Ricardian: simply because 
luxuries are consumed more as the world is getting richer, it is likely that luxuries are newer goods, with 
whose technology less developed countries have not yet caught up. 
 
15 We calculate the partial derivative of bilateral one-way trade flow with respect to inequality. 
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variation of greatest interest. The results provide a fairly strong confirmation of the 
presumption that whether a good is a luxury or a necessity is mostly determined by 
country of origin, not country of destination. To see this, consider each row one by one. 
For the first and the third rows whenever the results are statistically significant, the row 
determines the sign of the partial effect of inequality on trade. In particular, by moving 
through the first row (barring the import demand from middle income countries which 
has a positive sign but is statistically insignificant), one can see that import demand from 
all income levels behaves as if the exports of low income countries are necessities. 
Analogously from the last row, exports from high-income countries behave as luxuries, 
irrespective of the income level of the importing country. 
 Only for middle income exporters does the rule break down. Here, we have a 
result similar to something that we have already encountered: what is a luxury for 
someone may be a necessity for someone else at a different income level. In particular the 
pattern of signs in the middle row is reasonable: as the importer grows richer, it sees 
middle income countries more and more as low income, and therefore it sees middle 
income exports more and more as necessities: the sign of the coefficient starts out 
positive and ends as negative. Note that a sign pattern that would be the reverse of this 
would be unexpected. 
 In sum, we provide strong support for the following stylized fact, to our 
knowledge not known to the empirical economics literature: poor countries export 
necessities, and rich countries export luxuries. 
 
D. Robustness checks 
We have performed several robustness checks, a selection of which is reported in table 5. 
First, we checked for non-linearities with respect to inequality, with results reported in 
columns 1 and 2. Introduction of an additional squared inequality term does not 
qualitatively (or even quantitatively) change the results. The partial derivatives of imports 
with respect to inequality remain preserved in terms of sign and magnitude. Furthermore 
they remain preserved in significance if one accepts an 11% significance level.16 
                                                 
16 Even though inequality and inequality squared are individually insignificant in column 2 for necessities, 
they are jointly significant leading to the low p-value for the partial effect of inequality. 
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 One may argue that the Gini index, which we have used throughout, is relatively 
insensitive to the extremes of the income distribution. As a further robustness check, we 
use the ratio of the income share of the fifth quintile to that of the first quintile (Q51) as 
an alternative measure of inequality (columns 3, 4). Q51 has the right signs – negative in 
the case of necessities and positive in the case of luxuries. While it is insignificant in the 
case of necessities, it is highly significant (at the 1% level) in the case of luxuries. 
Columns (5) – (8) report Tobit and median regressions. This is done since, as 
mentioned before, the dependent variable is bounded below by zero, and the bound is 
observed for a large number of bilateral observations. The results are very robust for the 
median regressions, and for necessities with Tobit, while the coefficient of interest loses 
significance for the Tobit regression in luxuries. Note that the interpretation of the Tobit 
results is affected by the likely existence of heteroscedasticity in our panel data, for 
which to our knowledge there is no adequate econometric treatment in Tobit.  
Columns (9) and (10) report the results when we exclude from the sample each 
country’s main trading partners. In particular, we exclude observations in which the 
exporting country represents more than 1% of the importer’s import flows. As explained 
in section 3, this is done to allay the worry that the Inequality is endogenous. For the 
remaining (smaller) exporters, most likely the chain of causality runs unambiguously 
from inequality to imports, not the other way round. An inspection of columns (9) and 
(10) reveals the essential robustness of the main results in table 1. Columns (11) and (12) 
perform the analogous analysis when we exclude the largest five economies each year 
from the exporting side.17  
                                                 
17 Some additional robustness tests were performed. We tried adding the inequality of the exporting 
country, which for the bilateral trade sample we are focusing on, enters insignificantly, in all cases with a t-
ratio less than one. This is understandable since in deriving the gravity model, we find that the country that 
produces a tradable good will consume a negligible share of the output of that good in a world with many 
countries. Bilateral imports should then be a function of, in addition to the other gravity variables, the 
importing country’s inequality and the inequality of the rest of the world, which in turn can be expressed as 
a function of importing country inequality and overall world inequality. Our year dummies capture 
variations in world inequality from one year to another. In one set of regressions we include a variable for 
“remoteness” of the country pair, which is sometimes used in the gravity literature, without affecting the 
main conclusion. We also tried to combine some of the tests, for example, including the square of the 
inequality measure in a Tobit regression. Finally, for the Rauch categories, we tried to separate regressions 
for the w and for the r goods, in all cases getting no qualitative changes. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we are mostly concerned with the question of how a change in income 
distribution affects the volume and pattern of trade. In the framework of established trade 
theory, the assumption of homothetic and identical tastes rules out that the distribution of 
income has any effect on trade. In our framework, we drop the assumption of homothetic 
preferences, which allows us to pursue empirically an investigation on the effect of 
inequality on trade with the use of a gravity model. 
Overall, our findings show that inequality affects the structure and the origin of 
trade flows.  In almost every regression, inequality variables are both economically and 
statistically significant. When we separate goods according to whether they are luxuries 
or necessities, based on consumer surveys, we see that a product’s characteristic is a 
major predictor of the impact of inequality on trade. This provides a tighter link with the 
theory. Furthermore, we document another pattern in the relationship between inequality 
and trade: as inequality increases in the importing countries, we observe that imports 
from rich countries increase while imports from poor countries decrease. We note that 
most standard variables of the gravity model remain qualitatively the same, in the 
presence of inequality, as in the existing gravity literature.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix describes how we classified 4-digit SITC goods as necessities or 
luxuries.18 First, we obtained data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on household 
expenditure shares in the US in 2001. The BLS separates household population into five 
income quintiles and, for each quintile, lists the average expenditure share of about 100 
expenditure categories. For example, the BLS category labeled “APM1” is “apparel and 
services, men, 16 and over.” For this category, expenditure shares of the different 
quintiles, from the bottom quintile to the top quintile, are 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0%, 
respectively. We defined any category whose expenditure share is weakly rising (as in 
this example) as a luxury. Conversely, any category whose expenditure share weakly 
decreases is classified as a necessity. We did not classify either as luxuries or necessities 
those BLS categories whose shares vary in a non-monotonic way, or whose shares do not 
vary at all. 
 The second part of our procedure was to match the BLS categories to SITC codes. 
To do so, we went through the description of each 4-digit SITC, and matched it with a 
BLS description. Some judgment calls were needed, as we now detail. To use the 
example above, we matched the BLS category APM1, “apparel and services, men, 16 and 
over,” to the following SITC codes: 
• 8421: overcoats and other coats, men’s 
• 8422: suits, men’s, of textile fabrics 
• 8423: trousers, breeches etc., of textile fabrics19 
• 8424: jackets, blazers, of textile fabrics 
• 8429: other outer garments of textile fabrics 
• 842A: outer garments, men’s, of textile fabrics 
• 842X: outer garments, men’s, of textile fabrics 
• 8441: shirts, men’s, of textile fabrics 
These eight SITCs were therefore assigned as luxuries, and many other SITC codes were 
in this way assigned as either luxuries or necessities. We also assigned as luxuries less 
                                                 
18 A file with our classification is posted online: http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/vmtrindade/research.htm. 
 
19 Even though “men’s” is not explicitly mentioned in this category 8423 or in 8424 and 8429, it can be 
inferred from the “X” and “A” categories, as explained later. 
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than ten SITC categories, for which there was no direct BLS correspondence, but that 
clearly are luxuries: for example, SITC 8973, “jewelry of gold, silver or platinum.” Of 
course, many SITC remained unclassified either as luxuries or necessities, because there 
was no clear BLS correspondence. 
 Some of the judgment calls had to do with the fact that the wording describing the 
BLS codes and the SITC did not correspond to each other in a clean way. Furthermore, 
generally speaking, the BLS categories are at a fairly more aggregated level than the 
SITC. To illustrate these problems, take SITC categories 0573 “bananas, fresh or dried,” 
and 0579 “fruit, fresh or dried, not elsewhere specified.” We matched both to the BLS 
category FHF1 “fresh fruits,” on the following two assumptions: consumer tastes for 
most fruits are similar, therefore consumer behavior for a more disaggregated fruit 
(bananas) should closely match the consumer behavior for aggregate fruit; furthermore, 
most trade is likely to be in fresh fruit, the part in which the BLS and SITC descriptions 
coincide. 
 The SITC, as revised by Statistics Canada, includes some codes ending in X or 
XX, which for our purposes can be interpreted as aggregate, or “unallocated,” trade (for 
more details, see Feenstra 2000, page 5). The criterion to match these codes to the BLS 
codes was a modified majority rule. Generally, if the BLS supplied a closely 
corresponding aggregate code (those codes end in 0 or 00), we simply matched the 
corresponding aggregates; otherwise, if over half the disaggregated SITC codes were 
assigned to a single BLS code, we also assigned the aggregate SITC code to the same 
BLS code.20 
 Another issue was posed by the so-called rolled-up codes, also created by 
Statistics Canada, many of which end with the letter A. These codes were the result of 
combining two or more SITC codes (for details the reader is referred again to the 
Feenstra paper). We checked all rolled-up codes for consistency. Generally, we forced 
consistency by letting the rolled-up code dictate its assigned BLS code to all the original 
SITCs that were rolled up into it. In some cases, we used judgment to make exceptions to 
                                                 
20 An exception to this general rule was SITC 1XXX, “beverages and tobacco,” which we assigned to BLS 
AB00 “alcoholic beverages,” rather than TB00 “tobacco products and smoking supplies.” Note that for our 
purposes this choice does not matter, since both AB00 and TB00 are necessities according to expenditure 
shares. 
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this rule. For example, Statistics Canada rolled up code 7631 “gramophones & record 
players, electric,” into 7649 “parts of apparatus of division 76.” We left 7649 unassigned 
to any BLS code.21 However, we decided to still assign 7631 to the BLS category that 
clearly corresponds to it: ENT0 “televisions, radios, audio equipment.” 
 To summarize, at the end of this procedure, we had three types of SITC: luxuries, 
necessities, and unassigned. We dropped all unassigned trade, and separately aggregated 
the luxuries and the necessities. Thus, for exporter i, importer j, and year t, we had two 
trade flows: exports in luxuries; and exports in necessities. 
                                                 
21 This was also the result of a general criterion. Since the BLS expenditure categories refer to final 
consumer expenditures, there is no information regarding parts or components. Therefore, all SITCs that 
refer specifically to parts were left unassigned, and therefore were dropped out of all estimations. Also 
unassigned were all machinery, except when these are household appliances. Finally, we left unassigned 
codes that mix machinery with both industrial and household applications (e.g. SITC 7412 “furnace burners 
for liquid fuel and parts”). 
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Figure 1 
Quasi-Homothetic Preferences 
Income per capita matters: vector C2 is not parallel to vector C1. 
Income Distribution does not matter: 2C0  = C1 + C2. 
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Table 1: OLS regressions with direct measure of Necessities and luxuries.  
           Regressand 
                   
Regressors             
Luxuries Necessities Luxuries Necessities 
Inequality 
 
0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
Log xGDP 1.319*** 
(0.287) 
1.045*** 
(0.357) 
  
Log mGDP -2.162*** 
(0.521) 
-0.216 
(0.586) 
  
Log xGDP/Capita 0.405 
(0.280) 
0.224 
(0.360) 
  
Log mGDP/Capita 3.815*** 
(0.572) 
1.705*** 
(0.660) 
  
Log distance -1.449*** 
(0.059) 
-1.487*** 
(0.070) 
-1.448*** 
(0.059) 
-1.487*** 
(0.069) 
Log (xGDP mGDP)   0.669*** 
(0.258) 
0.821*** 
(0.303) 
Log (xGDP/Capita 
mGDP/Capita) 
  0.977*** 
(0.255) 
0.447 
(0.309) 
Observations 26644 26644 26644 26644 
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.75 0.84 0.75 
Regressand: log of bilateral exports, in luxuries or in necessities.  
The column title shows the commodity category. x is the exporting country, m is the 
importing country.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered for country pairs.   
* denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Year, exporting and importing country dummies not shown.    
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Table 2: OLS results for separate Rauch categories. 
     Regresssand 
 
 
Regressors 
(1) 
 
n 
full 
(2) 
 
w+r 
full 
(3) 
 
n 
restr. 
(4) 
 
w+r 
restr. 
(5) 
 
n 
full 
(6) 
 
w+r 
full 
(7) 
 
n 
restr. 
(8) 
 
w+r 
restr. 
Inequality 0.011*** (0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.013***
(0.005) 
Log xGDP 0.349** 
(0.168) 
0.458** 
(0.214) 
0.488* 
(0.268) 
0.872** 
(0.356) 
    
Log mGDP -1.105*** 
(0.169) 
0.506** 
(0.211) 
-0.636 
(0.483) 
1.266** 
(0.590) 
    
Log xGDP/Capita 1.375*** 
(0.164) 
0.981*** 
(0.213) 
1.152*** 
(0.269) 
0.350 
(0.362) 
    
Log mGDP/Capita 2.551*** 
(0.175) 
1.256*** 
(0.219) 
2.446*** 
(0.548) 
0.771 
(0.646) 
    
Log distance -1.488*** 
(0.036) 
-1.617*** 
(0.039) 
-1.338*** 
(0.057) 
-1.510*** 
(0.071) 
-1.488*** 
(0.035) 
-1.618*** 
(0.039) 
-1.338*** 
(0.057) 
-1.511***
(0.071) 
Log (xGDP 
mGDP) 
    -0.256** 
(0.118) 
0.512*** 
(0.149) 
0.287 
(0.234) 
0.983*** 
(0.301) 
Log (xGDP/Capita 
mGDP/Capitaj) 
    1.836*** 
(0.115) 
1.050*** 
(0.148) 
1.349*** 
(0.238) 
0.338 
(0.309) 
Observations 67956 67956 26644 26644 67956 67956 26644 26644 
R-squared 0.82 0.72 0.85 0.74 0.82 0.72 0.85 0.74 
Regressand: log of bilateral exports, in differentiated goods (‘n’), and in homogeneous goods (‘w+r’). Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are the 
results with the full sample. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) restrict to observations in which the importing country is high income.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered for country pairs.    
* denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year, exporting and importing country dummies not shown. 
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Table 3: Regressions with interactions of source country income level 
                 Regressand 
 
Regressors 
Total exports 
(1) 
Total exports 
 (2) 
Inequality -0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Log xGDP 0.493** 
(0.194) 
 
Log mGDP -0.073 
(0.198) 
 
Log xGDP/Capita 1.210*** 
(0.196) 
 
Log mGDP/Capita 1.999*** 
(0.208) 
 
Log Distance -1.597*** 
(0.038) 
-1.598*** 
(0.038) 
Log (xGDP mGDP)  0.287** 
(0.137) 
Log (xGDP/Capita 
mGDP/Capita) 
 1.485*** 
(0.137) 
mHighIncome 1.555*** 
(0.302) 
1.704*** 
(0.320) 
mMidIncome -0.483* 
(0.275) 
-0.377 
(0.301) 
xHighIncome -2.673*** 
(0.251) 
-2.750*** 
(0.246) 
xMidIncome -0.651*** 
(0.225) 
-0.685*** 
(0.224) 
mInequality x mHighIncome -0.035*** 
(0.007) 
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
mInequality x mMidIncome 0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
mInequality x xHighIncome 0.077*** 
(0.005) 
0.077*** 
(0.005) 
mInequality x xMidIncome 0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
Observations 67956 67956 
R-squared 0.77 0.77 
‘x’ refers to exporting country variables. ‘m’ refers to importing country variables. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered for country pairs.  
*, **, *** denote results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
mHighIncome, mMidIncome: dummies for the importing country being high or mid-
income. xHighIncome, xMidIncome: analogous dummies for the exporting country. 
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Table 4: Partial effects of inequality on imports, by the income levels of 
importers and exporters. 
     Importer 
 
 
Exporter 
Low  
Income 
Medium 
Income 
High 
Income 
Low  
Income 
 
−0.0089 
(0.154) 
0.0069 
(0.188) 
−0.0441*** 
(1.14e−16) 
Medium 
Income 
 
0.0135** 
(0.031) 
0.0293*** 
(3.31e−08) 
−0.0217*** 
(1.25e−05) 
High 
Income 
 
0.0682*** 
(1.28e−26) 
0.0839*** 
(0) 
0.0330*** 
(4.26e−10) 
Partial effects of importer’s inequality on total imports, calculated from table 3, 
column (1). 
p-values in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denote results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks for the direct measure of luxuries and necessities    
        Regressand 
 
 
Regressors 
(1) 
 
Lux. 
(2) 
 
Nec. 
(3) 
 
Lux. 
(4) 
 
Nec. 
(5) 
 
Lux.  
Tobit 
(6) 
 
Nec. 
Tobit 
Inequality (Gini) -0.099*** 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
  -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Square Inequality 
(Gini) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
    
Inequality (Q51)   0.046*** 
(0.016) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
  
Log xGDP 1.319*** 
(0.285) 
1.045*** 
(0.357) 
1.984*** 
(0.335) 
1.174*** 
(0.405) 
2.963*** 
(0.246) 
1.667*** 
(0.250) 
Log mGDP -2.384*** 
(0.497) 
-0.250 
(0.575) 
-2.668***
(0.622) 
-0.341 
(0.697) 
-2.402*** 
(0.544) 
0.273 
(0.542) 
Log 
xGDP/Capita 
0.405 
(0.278) 
0.224 
(0.360) 
-0.386 
(0.328) 
0.057 
(0.408) 
-1.023*** 
(0.242) 
-0.414* 
(0.243) 
Log 
mGDP/Capita  
3.971*** 
(0.555) 
1.729*** 
(0.654) 
4.466*** 
(0.614) 
1.426** 
(0.710) 
4.860*** 
(0.642) 
1.256** 
(0.636) 
Log Distance -1.450*** 
(0.059) 
-1.487***
(0.070) 
-1.479***
(0.061) 
-1.477***
(0.073) 
-1.754*** 
(0.030) 
-1.591*** 
(0.031) 
Log Remote       
Observations 26644 26644 21757 21757 26644 26644 
R-squared 0.84 0.75 0.84 0.75   
Partial effect of  
Inequality (p-
values) 
0.007 
(0.11) 
-0.013***
(0.004) 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses.       
* denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Column title shows commodity categories.       
Year, exporting and importing country dummies not shown.      
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Table 5 (continued)       
            Regressand 
 
 
Regressor 
(7) 
 
Lux. 
Median 
 
(8) 
 
Nec. 
Median 
(9) 
 
Lux. 
(10) 
 
Nec. 
(11) 
 
Lux. 
(12) 
 
Nec. 
(13) 
 
Lux. 
(14) 
 
Nec. 
Inequality (Gini) 0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
Log xGDP 0.523*** 
(0.146) 
0.237 
(0.155) 
1.112*** 
(0.376) 
2.417*** 
(0.598) 
1.274*** 
(0.306) 
1.139*** 
(0.380) 
1.217*** 
(0.290) 
1.083*** 
(0.366) 
Log mGDP -3.015*** 
(0.303) 
0.166 
(0.322) 
-1.778*** 
(0.491) 
-2.815*** 
(0.839) 
-2.147*** 
(0.543) 
-0.222 
(0.613) 
-2.428*** 
(0.526) 
-0.117 
(0.590) 
Log xGDP/Capita 0.986*** 
(0.142) 
1.005*** 
(0.151) 
-0.649* 
(0.373) 
-2.050*** 
(0.573) 
0.453 
(0.301) 
0.157 
(0.383) 
0.458 
(0.281) 
0.205 
(0.363) 
Log mGDP/Capita 4.568*** 
(0.348) 
0.861** 
(0.370) 
3.030*** 
(0.513) 
5.129*** 
(0.883) 
3.764*** 
(0.594) 
1.717** 
(0.688) 
3.955*** 
(0.571) 
1.653** 
(0.659) 
Log Distance -1.295*** 
(0.018) 
-1.372*** 
(0.020) 
-0.789*** 
(0.084) 
-1.045*** 
(0.153) 
-1.499*** 
(0.062) 
-1.558*** 
(0.075) 
-1.450*** 
(0.059) 
-1.487*** 
(0.070) 
Log Remote       -9.810** 
(4.201) 
3.645 
(4.091) 
Observations 26644 26644 15320 12782 25339 25339 26644 26644 
R-squared   0.54 0.65 0.81 0.74 0.84 0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.       
* denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.       
Column title shows commodity categories.       
Year, exporting and importing country dummies not shown.   
